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Markman Pro Publico:
Friending the Courts on Patent Claim Interpretation Issues
by Charles Lee Thomason1
I. Introduction1
In Markman claim term disputes, the
paramount interest of the public in patents and in the
public domain is unrepresented, even though “patent
rights are ‘issues of great moment to the public.’”2
What delineates the outer bounds of the patent claim
interpretation inquiry are the “private interests of the
litigants.”3 The public interest is set aside.
Neither the courts nor the litigants are well
positioned to address the “underlying policy of the
patent system” or to ask pointedly whether the patent
claims, unless properly construed, have enough “worth
to the public” to “outweigh the restrictive effect of the
limited patent monopoly.”4 The public interest in how
inventions are described in issued patents is a precise
but flexible construct that confines the granted rights
within legal limits, disagrees with claims being read so
expansively that information is taken back from the
public domain, and urges objective interpretations
that favor neither litigants’ infringement nor invalidity
strategies.
Amicus groups could define zones of interest
when certain patent claims are interpreted and move
to represent the public interest in the Markman
proceedings. A public interest advocacy group
consisting of law students who have completed a patent
law course could be formed to identify cases that
involve patent claims that affect segments of commerce
important to the public. Through an admitted
attorney and local counsel, such a group would enter an
appearance for the limited purpose of participating as
amicus in the claim interpretation proceedings.
This article argues first that amici could protect
the public domain and enforce the public notice
function of patent claims. Then it argues in Section
Three that having the litigants restrict the range of
interpretations a court may consider leaves the public
interest aspects out of the decision-making process.
Next, Section Four of the article further contrasts the
1. Patent attorney in private practice, and adjunct IP Professor
teaching at the University of Kentucky College of Law. I can be
reached at c.leethomason@gmail[dot]com.
2. Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co.,
324 U.S. 806, 815 (1944).
3. Id.
4. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3258 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1966)).

litigation-driven interpretations and the objective rules
of construction. The final section examines whether an
amicus group representing the public interest might be
excluded from claim interpretation proceedings.
II. Seeking Public Notice and Guarding the
Public Domain
The most fundamental policy behind the
Patent Clause is enrichment of the public domain.5
Neither a Court nor Congress can endow patents
with rights that “remove existent knowledge from the
public domain.”6 The quid pro quo for a patent grant
is putting “the public in possession of ” the invention
described and claimed so that “the public is informed,
not only of what has been patented, but of what still
remains common as before.”7
Starting with the Patent Act of 1793, every
inventor and patent has been required to employ “such
full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same
from all other things before known.”8
“Otherwise, a ‘zone of uncertainty
which enterprise and experimentation
may enter only at the risk of
infringement claims would discourage
invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field,’
and ‘[t]he public [would] be deprived
of rights supposed to belong to it,
without being clearly told what it is
that limits these rights.’”9
Thus, clarity, notice, and preservation of the public
5. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance
between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant
advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’.”).
6. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (noting that a patentable invention
must “add to the sum of useful knowledge”).
7. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 413, 446 (1822).
8. Patent Act of 1793, §3 Ch. 11, 21 Stat. 318, 321, set out
in Evans, 20 U.S. at 380-81.
9. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390
(1996) (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S.
228, 236 (1942) and Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876).
See also Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884) (“The public
has the undoubted right to use, and it is to be presumed to us, what
is not specifically claimed in the patent.”).
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domain are public interest factors that deserve no
less attention than is given to the litigation goals that
parties have grounded on pliable passages in the patent
application.10
An amicus group could serve the public interest
by advocating for patent claim interpretations that take
nothing away from the public domain, do not capture
the prior art, and do not expand patent claim scope
through equivalence.11 Enforcing the requirements of
public notice, describing and enabling the invention in
“full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” and “particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming” the invention
would ensure that the public interest is represented
when patent claims are interpreted.12
III. Litigants Establish the Perimeter Around
the Interpretation Issues
In patent claim term disputes, the litigants
select which claim limitations they will urge be
interpreted and which terms will be strategically
avoided. Each litigant’s self-interest becomes the sole
determinant for inclusion or exclusion of a claim
limitation or term in the Markman presentations to the
district judge.
Each litigant’s decisions about whether to
battle over a particular claim term involve strategic
interplay with which interpretations most likely
will prove or avoid infringement or sustain validity
or invalidity. The strategic goal of the patentee is
to dispute just enough of the claim terms to win
on infringement without going so far as to risk
invalidation. An accused infringer may put all
of its resources into invalidating the patent and
almost none toward interpretations essential to noninfringement of the claims. Some defendants in patent
infringement actions will urge that practically every
claim term limitation be construed, while their motive
is unconnected to pursuing an interpretation that is
outcome determinative of any issue.13
10. Proper claim interpretation will limit any patent that
“withdraws what is already known into the field of its monopoly
and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.” KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
11. See Howe Mach. Co. v. Nat’l Needle Co., 134 U.S. 388, 394
(1890) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) (“The
claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of
making the patentee define precisely what his invention is, and it is
unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it
in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.”).
12. 35 U.S.C. §112 (2006); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc.
v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046 1052, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“The claims give notice . . . to the public at large, including
potential competitors, after the patent has issued.”).
13. See Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven
C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711, 731 (2010) (“It
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Once the litigants have set the bounds for
their claims interpretation dispute, all the other claims
and limitations are ignored. In districts with local
patent rules, only those “asserted” claims designated
by the parties will be construed.14 “[O]nly those terms
need be construed that are in controversy, and only to
the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”15 An
amicus group that urges a widened inquiry into the
patent claims might be ruled out of bounds by the
court or be deemed unwelcome by the litigants.
The common concerns with participation
by amici are an expansion of the issues framed by
the litigants, a lack of stake in the actual controversy,
and added work for the judiciary. One can advocate
that the overarching public interest in patent claims
being construed fairly deserves more weight than the
judicial efficiency perceived to result from the dispute
being confined to those claim term arguments that the
litigants prefer be considered.
“It is true that, in ordinary private
litigation, courts sometimes confine
their decisions narrowly, and, if one
point is sufficient to support a decision,
other points are not discussed. Even
if that could be said to be the usual
practice, it loses much of its pertinence
in patent cases. A patent is a ‘public
franchise,’ a legalized monopoly. To
allow a patent to remain apparently
valid when the issue of invalidity
is raised and the court sees that the
patent is invalid, is to ignore the
paramount public interest. Because
no representative of the public may
institute a suit to have a patent held
invalid, and because the courts have
no staff of independent experts to aid
them in patent suits, the courts must,
in most cases, rely on the litigants….” 16
Rather than have district courts rely on the
is all too common for the parties to propose differing construction
but be unable to articulate why the differences matter.”). See too,
Comment to Northern District of Illinois Local Patent Rule 4.1,
the “limitation to ten claim terms to be presented for construction
is intended to require the parties to focus upon outcomedeterminative or otherwise significant disputes.”
14. See, e.g., Local Patent Rules 4-3(c)2, N.D. Il.
available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/LocalRules.
aspx?rtab=patentrules, Local Patent Rule 4.1, N.D. Cal, available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/184/Local%20Rules%20
6.2.11%20with%20Cross%20Refs.pdf; infra note 43.
15. Vivid Tech., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,
803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
16. Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d
Cir. 1942), (Frank, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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litigants exclusively in Markman proceedings, amicus
groups could undertake the role of representing
“the paramount public interest” in patents being
construed properly.17 It is to be questioned whether
the deliberative and litigious adversarial process can
accommodate an amicus group to represent the public
interest and advocate for the patent in suit to be
interpreted more objectively.18
The evaluative and objective process begins
with the amicus group: (i) identifying ongoing patent
suits with terms that, when interpreted, will affect
some significant sector of commerce, innovation, or
widespread public consumption, and (ii) appearing
as amicus to aid in claim interpretation. Once an
appropriate Markman matter is identified, the amicus
group must move, with or without the consent of
the litigants, to appear in the case and brief the claim
construction issues.
It is recognized in patent jurisprudence that
the “public interest here is not in the fate of these
litigants[;] . . . the interest is in the way this judge made
law affects technologic innovation and competition.”19
Even properly construed patents “serve as a barrier
to competition for the type of subject matter that is
patented.”20 The litigants’ dominant role and selfinterest in patent claim interpretation proceedings
would be tempered if the public interest were urged as
a worthy component of the Markman determination.
In practice however, the litigants and the district court
may prefer that a public interest advocacy group not be
permitted to serve the role of amicus and present claim
interpretation arguments.

17. Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co.,
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1944).
18. See Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632
F.3d 1246, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“Unfortunately, the nature of our adversary
system often causes those patents to be asserted against someone
engaged in activity not contemplated by the inventors . . . and
litigation counsel attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole, or,
in other words, to fit into the claim language what the inventors
never contemplated as part of their invention.”). Amici have argued
claim construction issues to the Federal Circuit, see e.g., Orion IP,
LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 605 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“The court’s finding of nonobviousness is even more surprising in
light of its construction of the claim term ‘a computerized method’.”
Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, 2009 WL1900190.
19. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344
F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
20. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3257 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).

IV. Evaluative, Objective Advocacy for the
Public Interest in Patent Interpretation
Considerable dicta pronounces that patents
and the scope of the exclusive patent rights enforceable
by law are imbued with the “public interest.”21 Such
pronouncements attach to patents that are invalid or
unenforceable and against overbroad or unbounded
patent claims.22 Yet, that “public interest” is of no
interest to an accused infringer, and is of minimal
concern to a patentee seeking to enforce its rights
against infringement.23
While the representation of the public
interest in patent litigation is still actively debated, the
discussion ultimately leads to specific case examples,
infra. However, it is not the purpose of this writer to
critique specific patents, litigants, or strategies. With
due respect for the exceptional work of litigating
patent attorneys and those district courts where most
of the cases are venued, some examples are offered for
discussion.
Consider cases where the same claim terms
were construed more than once and differently by
different judges. Might objective advocacy from an
amicus group representing the public interest have
assisted in achieving a more efficient and correct
result? Many courts have construed the claim terms
“database” or “memory” device, albeit in the context of
various patents.24 The results of the separate Markman
21. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 344 (1971) (“The patent is a privilege . . . which is
conditioned by a public purpose . . . [and] results from invention
and is limited to the invention which it defines.”); Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (holding that there is an
“important public interest in permitting full and free competition in
the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.”);
Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1405 n.31 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
(stating that during prosecution an applicant “may then amend his
claims” to make it less likely a patentee will argue the claims should
be “interpreted as giving broader coverage than is justified,” because
“[t]his thought, in “the public interest, is deemed to be paramount
to an applicant’s interest.”).
22. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. 324 U.S. 806;
One recalls the claim of Samuel F.B. Morse to every “use of the
motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electromagnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances,” which was ruled
invalid. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1853).
23. An exception being when a patentee seeks an injunction.
See Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858,
865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“the standards of the public interest, not
the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and
need for injunctive relief in these cases”) (quoting Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)) (remanding case “for further
proceedings to consider what this interest is”), cert. den’d, 469 U.S.
856 (1984).
24. Recent examples of Markman proceedings to construe
“database” include Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No.
C 09-05897 RS, 2011 WL 196884, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20,
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rulings regarding those terms ended up at the Federal
Circuit, which then a standard for review of conflicting
constructions of the same claim term.25
The Finisar appeal panel consulted two
separate district courts’ interpretations of “information
database” from the same patent.26 The Eastern District
of Texas construed “information database” to mean
“a collection of computerized information which can
be accessed.”27 The Northern District of California
construed it as “a dynamic, structured collection of
digitized data capable of being held in computer
storage.”28 Neither reading of “information database”
by these courts was adopted on appeal, even though
the same objective rules of claim interpretation were
applied. The Federal Circuit construed “information
database” as used in the patent to be “a collection of
computerized information which can be accessed and
searched, and from which selected information can be
retrieved, and where the search and retrieval capabilities
are at least as specific as those of the hierarchically
arranged set of indices.”29
In all three proceedings the interpretations
urged were a product of the litigants’ self-interest and,
to an extent, how the “information database” was
construed had an impact on the public domain. The
Eastern District of Texas’ definition is the broadest, and
would capture most any database in the public domain.
When the Federal Circuit found that access, search,
and retrieval capabilities were defining limitations,
the claimed information database was narrowed to
correspond more to the specific invention, distinct from
the broader domain of prior art databases. Reading
a claim term broadly tends to increase the likelihood
that infringement can be proven, but at the risk that
the broad definition also will read on invalidating prior
art. Litigants try to drive the Markman process into
the definitional confines outlined by their commercial
interests. An amicus group that advocates the public
interest would urge an objective reading of patent
claims and that the definitional process be driven by
2011), MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1227
(N.D. Cal. 2010), Civix-DDI v. Hotels.Com, No. 05 C 06869,
2010 WL 4386475, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2010), and Jardin v.
Datallegro, Inc., No. 08-CV-1462-IEG (RBB), 2010 WL 3910481,
at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010).
25. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“In the interest of uniformity and correctness, this
court consults the claim analysis of different district courts on the
identical terms in the context of the same patent.”).
26. See U.S. Patent No. 5,404,505 claim 16 (filed Nov. 1,
1991).
27. Finisar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 517 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
28. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Corp. v. Finisar Corp., No.
C 06-04206 WHA, 2007 WL 1052821, at *6 (N.D. Cal. April 6,
2007).
29. Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1331.
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clarity, conformity with the disclosure in the public
record, and protection of the public domain.
In selected cases, amici representing the public
interest could offer a wholly objective construction of
the claim terms based on the intrinsic record that gave
notice to the public.30 The claims would be “construed
objectively and without reference to the accused
device.”31 An objective interpretation by public interest
amici would be uninfluenced by whether it captures
features in the accused device or in the prior art.
Interpreting a claim to have greater breadth
may take more away from the public domain, but that
added breadth will also make the claim read on more
prior art.32 The corollary is that broadly construed
claim terms are more likely to be infringed.33 Indeed,
adding breadth to claims will expand what might
infringe by equivalence.34 This suggests that the public
interest is antithetical to overbroad or invalid claims
that may result in undeserved monopolies, and further
that the public interest may tend to favor construing
claims narrowly and interpreting art in the public
domain broadly.35
The zones of interest to be represented by
amici who advocate for the public interest would
include adherence to the intrinsic evidence and
30. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
373 (1996) (a “patent must describe the exact scope of an invention
. . . to ‘secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and]
to apprise the public of what is still open to them.’”) (quoting
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891)).
31. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,
803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
32. In Finisar, the disclosure in the prior art was read broadly,
which protected the available public domain of technology. 523
F.3d at 1336 (“Thus, one of skill would interpret the passage
broadly to present many varied options for each of the tiers under
consideration.”).
33. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376,
1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The jurisprudence of claim construction
reflects the difficult balance between a patentee’s exhortation that
courts should read the claims broadly and unlimited to the specific
embodiments shown in the specification . . . [and in] counterpoint,
an accused infringer often argues, as in this case, that if the claims
are read sufficiently broadly as to reach the accused device, the
claims also read on the prior art and are invalid.”).
34. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (the “jury found infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents . . . [and] because the jury found infringement under
the trial court’s more restricted reading of the claims, this court need
not remand for a[literal] infringement determination according to
this court’s broader claim interpretation.”).
35. Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329
U.S. 394, 401 (1947) (“[Court’s] solicitude for the interest of
the public fostered by freedom from invalid patents . . . has been
manifest by the line of decisions . . . .”); Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (“There
can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied
broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions
of the statutory claiming requirement.”).
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objective interpretation of claim limitations, without
undue regard for the accused subject matter, but with
an appropriate regard for relevant art in the public
domain. Review of the case law indicates how often
the Circuit court changes the claim term definitions
presented by litigants in district court Markman
hearings. On balance, public interest representation
in Markman proceedings would aid district courts in
reaching an objective result, with the claims of the
patent defined more objectively and the process driven
less by choices grounded upon the litigants’ commercial
objectives.
V. The Interests of the Public Will Not Be
Invited in Markman Proceedings
Amici could validate the “objective test” on
which the rules for patent claim interpretation are
grounded.36 The pursuit of uniformity in how claims
are interpreted should accommodate the public
interest in patents. Indeed, the standards for claim
construction redound to the public “notice” function
and to how “persons of skill,” i.e., an informed public,
would understand the claim terms and the prior
art.37 Moreover, Markman spawned a formulaic set
of rules intended to be applied objectively and to
produce uniform results.38 The rules for patent claim
interpretation and those for construing contract terms
objectively share many tenets.39 However, all patents
and few contracts implicate the public interest. Amici
are as able as the litigants and the courts to divine
meaning from the art and specification and to apply
well-established rules to interpret the claims.
In Markman proceedings, amici could advocate
for the rule of law, the intrinsic record, the public
domain, and the public interest.40
36. Markman, v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986.
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
37. See generally, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appl. Corp., 304
U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The limits of a patent must be known for
the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive
genius of others, and the assurance that the subject of the patent
will be dedicated ultimately to the public.”).
38. “[W]e see the importance of uniformity in the treatment
of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of
construction to the court.” Markman, 517 U.S. 370at 390 (1996)
(aff’g 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[T]he objective
test [is] what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have understood the term to mean.”).
39. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 986 (“[T]he focus in construing
disputed terms in claim language is not the subjective intent of
the parties to the patent contract when they used a particular term
[but] rather is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the
term to mean”); id. at 987 (“[T]he more appropriate analogy for
interpreting patent claims is the statutory interpretation analogy.”).
40. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (quoting Merrill v.
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877) ([Absent clarity, t]he public

“Historically, then, an amicus curiae is
an impartial individual who suggests
the interpretation and status of the law,
gives information concerning it, and
whose function is to advise in order
that justice may be done, rather than to
advocate a point of view so that a cause
may be won by one party or another.”41
On Markman issues, amici can serve that
historic role by representing the public interest
impartially and without regard to whether one litigant’s
strategy or another is served.
Amici representing the public interest may
urge that claims be interpreted in ways that favor
neither litigant. When the district court considers the
arguments for interpreting claims one way or the other,
amici can present an objective view more consonant
with the rules of construction that the reviewing court
will apply.
The litigants are expected to press for claim
interpretations that embody the wording needed
to win, or to not lose their case. However, when a
patentee and the accused infringer fail to get claims
interpreted broadly enough to prove infringement or
invalidity, the result is a wash-out. That too may be an
outcome that results from the advocacy of amici for the
public interest.
In practice, neither party may desire for amici
to participate, and the court may decline to consider
claim interpretation issues beyond those presented
by the litigants. Exclusion of amici representing the
public interest might be based on limits in Article III
to actual controversies between litigants, or on a theory
that amici lack standing or that when amici are not
excluded, they must not go beyond the issues framed
by the litigants. “Amici are allowed to participate .
. . to assist the court in achieving a just resolution
of issues raised by the parties [but not] to interject
into a case issues which the litigants, whatever their
reasons might be, have chosen to ignore.”42 Still,
case management orders typically can accommodate
complexities that may arise from the participation of
amicus or nominal parties.43 Those tools, joined with
[would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it . . . .”).
41. Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 2d 418, 420 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
42. Lane v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 175 (1st
Cir. 1989); See also San Juan Cnty., Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d
1163, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kelly, J., concurring) (“The principal
difference between party and amicus status is that only parties
ordinarily have the right to raise new issues . . . .”). The better view
is that of Judge Frank. Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp, 130 F.2d
290, 293 (2nd Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring).
43. Review of local rules databases did not disclose district
courts having rules governing the participation of amici in civil
cases, and so, it is presumed that case management orders serve that
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the typical timetables in Local Patent Rules, provide
more than adequate means to permit amici to appear
and represent the public interest.44
The appropriate instance for amici to
represent the public interest would not have the issue
of infringement or validity turn upon how a single
term in the claims was interpreted. Instead, the
preferable case would entail a broader examination of
interrelated claim terms, some of which are commonly
used in many patents, and a claimed invention that
affects the public interest. Examples may be cases
that could affect access to the internet or to generic
drugs, or cases regarding emerging, still-developing
technologies.45 The public interest concerns regarding
notice, possession of the invention, the public domain,
and restrictions on further innovation are more readily
identified by amici in such cases.
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, amici can serve a useful purpose
in Markman claim interpretation proceedings by
representing the public interest factors identified in
numerous, important decisions about patents and in
the policies that the Patent Clause should advance. A
patent, and are specifically its claims to a disclosed
invention, grants exclusive rights as against the public.
Invoking judicial power to ascertain the breadth or
limits of patent claims is as much a public interest
proceeding as a First Amendment case where prior
restraints affect public speech. The record supporting
the patent is public, and the rules of claim construction
work in service of the public’s understanding of which
exclusive rights were granted and what knowledge
remains in the public domain.
Fifteen years later, the Markman procedures are
still works in progress. An opportunity is presented for
amicus groups to elevate the public interests in patents
from mere dicta, and to advocate that public interest
concerns with the fair interpretation of patent claims
should be a decisional element worthy of consideration
in Markman briefs and hearings.

purpose.
44. Local district court rules and best practices permit the
threshold claim terms to be interpreted earlier than those that may
be non-dispositive. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.RLocal Rules
4-3(c) (requiring parties to identify claim “terms whose construction
will be most significant to the resolution of the case.”).
45. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 438 (1822) (it([It] is enough,
and the public interest is sufficiently guarded, if care be taken that it
[the patent] shall not be extended to create a monopoly in any other
machine, which may or may not be mentioned in the patent . . . .”).
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